INTRODUCTION
There has been a sea change in marriage equality in recent years, so much so that it is difficult to keep up with all the recent advancements. Twenty years ago, no country in the world and not a single US state had authorized same-sex marriage. Ten years ago, only a small number of countries and states did so. Today, the number of places where same-sex marriage is legal is growing so quickly that by the time this Article is published, it will almost certainly be outof-date.|| Currently in the United States, thirteen states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex marriage, enabling same-sex couples to enjoy the full and complete benefits of marriage, 1 although their marriages may not be recognized in some other states. Another seven states provide varying levels of recognition of same-sex relationships (through civil union and domestic partnership laws). 2 An overlapping thirty-five states have adopted restrictive language defining [Vol. 32:1 legislature passed a same-sex marriage law, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples are entitled to full marriage, the Colorado legislature passed limited partnership rights for same-sex couples, and the Nevada and Wisconsin legislatures passed domestic partnership laws. In 2010, the New Hampshire legislature passed a same-sex marriage law. In 2011, the Illinois, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Hawaii legislatures passed civil union laws, while the New York legislature passed a full marriage rights law. In 2012, the Washington and Maryland state legislatures passed same-sex marriage laws (which were upheld by voter referenda in both states) and Maine voters approved a ballot initiative legalizing same-sex marriage. 10 In March 2013, Colorado passed legislation to allow civil unions. 11 In May 2013, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Minnesota all legalized same-sex marriage. 12 And in June 2013, the US Supreme Court's decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry resulted in the legalization of same-sex marriage in California. 13 The procession has not been one way, however. In Iowa, voters removed three of the seven Supreme Court Justices who voted in favor of same-sex marriage, as a result of a well-funded campaign against their re-election. 14 Approximately three-fourths of the states have passed statutes, referenda, or constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. These states include the entire South (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Tennessee), most of the Mountain West and Great Plains (Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas), much of the Mid-West (Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio), much of the Middle Atlantic (Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and West Virginia), and four Pacific Coast states (Oregon, Hawaii, Alaska, and California). 15 The federal Defense of Marriage Act provides that such statesthose that do not recognize same-sex marriage-need not give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in states that do allow them. 16 Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Windsor does not affect the full faith and credit portion of the Defense of Marriage Act. 17 Despite the prohibitions by these thirty-five states, public opinion in the United States appears to be shifting rapidly. The 2012 Washington, Maryland, and Maine ballot initiatives are significant because they mark the first time that voters have approved same-sex marriage by popular vote. These initiatives show how US public opinion has changed in recent years. In fact, Maine voters had repealed a same-sex marriage law, passed by their state legislature, only two years prior to the ballot initiative legalizing same-sex marriage. 18 Prior to the Washington, Maryland, and Maine ballot initiatives, same-sex marriage had lost on previous ballot initiatives in US states thirty-two times. 19 Many of these initiatives involved state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. Yet, support for such initiatives has eroded over time. Since 2005, the average support for ballot initiatives banning same-sex marriage has decreased by 16 percentage points. 20 In 2012, Minnesota became the first state to reject a ballot initiative seeking to amend the state constitution to ban same-sex marriage. 21 The rapid progress towards increased marriage equality reflects a recent and significant shift in public attitudes. In 2003, 58 percent of Americans opposed same-sex marriage and only 33 percent were in favor. 22 By 2013, opposition had switched to support, with 50 percent of Americans in favor of same-sex marriage and only 43 percent opposed. 23 A large share of this shift occurred in only the last four years (with support growing from 37 percent in 2009 to 50 percent in 2013). 24 According to Nate Silver, this shift has led some people to speculate that growth in support for same-sex marriage is now rising at a faster rate than in previous years. 25 However, according to a regression analysis performed by Silver, the increase in support has actually been relatively constant since about 2004, when the Massachusetts Supreme Court first brought the issue of gay 17 . Windsor dealt with whether the federal definition of marriage in 1 U.S.C. § 7 could constitutionally deny federal benefits to same-sex couples who were legally married in a state that allowed such marriages. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-93 (2013 marriage to the fore by becoming the first state to legalize same-sex marriage. 26 According to Silver's calculations, same-sex marriage support has risen at a rate of about 2 percentage points a year since that time. 27 The upward shift in support is consistent across all age groups. Today, the silent generation (born 1928-1945 28 However, there are huge variations between generations, with millennials more than twice as supportive of samesex marriage as their grandparents. 29 According to Nate Silver, about half of the increase in support for same-sex marriage is due to generational turnover and about half is due to changes in attitudes within generations. 30 Some of the recent shift in public attitudes likely has to do with the decreased stigma of homosexuality. A greater number of Americans are likely to personally know someone who identifies as homosexual. In 2009, 49 percent of Americans responding to a poll answered that they knew a close friend or family member who was gay or lesbian, whereas by 2012, that number had increased to 60 percent. 31 Of the people who have changed their minds about same-sex marriage in the last 10 years, 32 percent said it was because they know someone who was homosexual. 32 Not only is homosexuality more pertinent on a personal level to Americans, but it has become more prominent on the national stage. In November 2012, Wisconsin became the first state to elect an openly gay Senator. 33 President Obama also recently became the first president to openly support gay marriage, even going so far as to incorporate marriage equality into his inaugural address and to file an amicus brief to the Supreme Court urging it to overturn the Defense of Marriage Act. 34 (Feb. 24, 2013) , http://www.businessinsider.com/polls-obama-gay-marriage-brief-inauguration for his second term, "Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under the law -for if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to one another must be equal as well." 35 Public attitudes and discourse have changed dramatically in the United States since 2008 when a slightly younger Senator Obama said during his 2008 presidential campaign, "I believe marriage is between a man and a woman. I am not in favor of gay marriage." 36 Perhaps decreased stigma and increased national attention have contributed to the recent increase in support for gay marriage. But what explains the more persistent differences in attitude, such as between the silent generation and millennials or between Southern states and Western states (where ballot initiatives to ban gay marriage passed with an average of 75 percent of the vote in the former, but only 58 percent of the vote in the latter)? 37 One of the most likely culprits to explain these fundamental attitudinal differences is religiosity, as discussed in Part IV.
These are important questions to ask in an age where public opinion is increasingly important to marriage equality. Ballot initiatives have been used to overturn same-sex marriage court decisions, such as in California in 2008. 38 Ballot initiatives have been used to repeal state legislation legalizing same-sex marriage, such as in Maine in 2010. 39 And ballot initiatives are the main source of state constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage. Increasingly, same-sex marriage law in the United States has tracked public opinion. Nate Silver projects that if current trends continue, by 2016, a majority of voters in 32 states will support same-sex marriage (up from 21 states in 2012), and by 2020, a majority of voters in 44 states will do so. 40 
II. CHANGES IN LAW AND ATTITUDES IN EUROPE

A. The Changing Legal Landscape
Unlike in the United States, marriage equality in Europe has come exclusively from legislatures, and not from the judiciary or public referenda. In the twentieth century, Europe broke major ground in providing rights for samesex couples, but progress was initially slow. In 1989, Denmark became the first country in the world to grant any official rights to same-sex couples by providing that same-sex individuals could enter civil unions. 41 Ten years later, in 1999, France recognized civil unions-called civil solidarity pacts (or "PACS")-for all couples, regardless of sex. 42 As in the United States, progress accelerated in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and appears to be developing even more rapidly in the second decade. In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country in the world to allow same-sex marriage, and in the same year, Germany created registered partnerships for same-sex couples. 43 53 The first same-sex marriages will begin in summer 2014. 54 The British Parliament, however, does not have jurisdiction to dictate marriage policies for the rest of the United Kingdom (Scotland and Northern Ireland). 55 Scotland is attempting to fast-track a same-sex marriage bill through its parliament. 56 The legislation enjoys wide cross-party support and is slated to pass by March 2014. 57 While these developments may appear to be cause for celebration for supporters of same-sex marriage, not every glimmer of progress solidifies into an actual recognition of rights. For example, Slovenia's legislature passed a new family code in 2011 that would have provided completely equal rights to samesex couples in domestic partnerships, but the proposal was rejected by a referendum of Slovenia's voters in 2012. 58 Luxembourg had a parliamentary proposal in 2010 to legalize same-sex marriage, but the bill has gone nowhere. 59 A Finnish same-sex marriage proposal in 2013 recently died in committee, on a narrow vote. 60 In addition, the push for marriage equality in Germany has been met with resistance from the legislature's conservative wing. Initially, there were some indications in Germany that Chancellor Angela Merkel might reverse course in her party's firm stance against marriage equality. In 2012, Germany's highest court (the Federal Constitutional Court) ruled that registered partners must be granted the same tax exemptions in property transfers that are granted to married couples. 61 Christian Democratic Union (or CDU)-to call for income tax equality for registered same-sex partners. 62 The thirteen members wrote that it was unacceptable that Merkel's government "again has to be ordered by the constitutional court to abolish inequalities." 63 Then in 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that same-sex partners have the right to adopt their partner's children and ordered parliament to change the law to so-reflect by the end of June. 64 Also, the court's president openly hinted that he and his fellow justices would likely take further steps towards granting same-sex couples additional rights, such as requiring that same-sex partners be treated the same as married couples for income taxation. 65 In response to the court's ruling, Volker Krauder, the head of the CDU, demanded that his party change its stance on the rights of same-sex couples, restating the refrain that the Conservatives should be embarrassed that they must be forced, once again, by the court to grant equal rights to same-sex couples. 66 Pressure for change continued to build as other prominent members of Merkel's party, including her Finance Minister, pushed the CDU to change its stance on gay rights, but Merkel ultimately had to bow to pressure from the more conservative elements of her party and abandon the push to change the party platform. 67 Thus, for the moment, further progress in Germany towards marriage equality must come from the Constitutional Court, not the legislature. However, the next round of elections in October 2013 may have changed the situation, if the new governmental coalition-which has not yet formed-were to include the SPD social-democratic party. 68 Finally, parts of Europe remain intransigently opposed to marriage equality. Most of Eastern Europe does not provide any official recognition of same-sex relationships and many Eastern European states also have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage. Of the South-East states, four do not recognize same-sex relationships (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovakia), six have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage (Bulgaria, Hungary, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine), one country recognizes limited rights for same-sex couples (Croatia recognizes unregistered cohabitation), and three countries recognize full partnerships (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia). 69 69. See MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, supra note 5 (for information on all of the forgoing, except Hungary's constitutional same-sex marriage ban); PINK NEWS, supra note 6 (for information same-sex relationships (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan), one country has a constitutional ban (Belarus), and one country still outlaws same-sex sexual activity (Uzbekistan). 70 Of the Baltic states, one does not recognize same-sex unions (Estonia) and two have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage (Latvia, Lithuania). 71 Lastly, of the Romano-Hellenic and Southern states, seven provide no recognition (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Monaco, Romania, Turkey, Vatican City) and one has a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage (Moldova). 72 In sum, only four Eastern European nations provide any recognition to same-sex couples: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. 73 
B. Public Attitudes in Europe Towards Same-Sex Marriage
The recent advance in same-sex marriage rights in Europe appears to be driven by strong public support, such as in France and the UK. In France, public support for same-sex marriage grew from 48 percent in 1996 to 55 percent in 2003 to 65 percent in 2012. 74 In the UK, 71 percent of Britons support their government's recent efforts to extend civil marriage to same-sex couples. 75 In the European Union generally, the countries with the most public support of marriage equality have either legalized same-sex marriage or have provided official recognition of same-sex relationships in the form of registered partnerships. In the last Eurobarometer survey to address the issue in 2006, an average of 44 percent of EU citizens supported allowing same-sex marriage across the EU. 76 On average, in EU countries that have legalized same-sex marriage, there was a rate of 61.5 percent public support as of 2006 for EU-wide same-sex marriage (82 percent in the Netherlands, 71 percent in Sweden, 69 percent in Denmark, 62 percent in Belgium, 56 percent in Spain, and 29 percent in Portugal). 77 Portugal remains an interesting outlier in that it legalized samesex marriage in spite of low public support. In countries that have registered partnership laws, there was an average rate of public support as of 2006 of 46.9 percent for EU-wide same-sex marriage (58 percent in Luxembourg, 52 percent in Germany, 52 percent in the Czech Republic, 49 percent in Austria, 48 percent in France, 46 percent in the UK, 45 percent in Finland, 41 percent in Ireland, and 31 percent in Slovenia). 78 Slovenia is an intriguing outlier, having passed a domestic partnership law in spite of low public support for marriage equality. In countries that do not recognize same-sex relationships, there was an average rate of public support for same-sex marriage as of 2006 of 19.7 percent (31 percent in Italy, 21 percent in Estonia, 19 percent in Slovakia, 18 percent in Malta, 15 percent in Greece, and 14 percent in Cyprus). 79 Lastly, in countries with constitutional bans on same-sex marriage, there was an average rate of public support as of 2006 of 16 percent for EU-wide same-sex marriage (18 percent in Hungary, 17 percent in Lithuania, 17 percent in Poland, and 12 percent in Latvia).
Like in the United States, millennials globally are far more supportive of same-sex marriage than their parents or grandparents. Eighty-three percent of millennials in the Netherlands, 81 percent in Spain, 81 percent in Sweden, 78 percent in Germany, 74 percent in Italy, 74 percent in the UK, 71 percent in France, 66 percent in Greece, and 54 percent in Poland support same-sex marriage. 80 Compared to the Eurobarometer survey results, 81 it appears that only in the Netherlands is millennial support for same-sex marriage roughly equivalent to the national average. Millennials in Spain and Germany are much more supportive than the national average, and millennials in Greece and Poland appear to be substantially more supportive than the national average. 82 What explains higher support for same-sex marriage among millennials? And why is this effect not seen in the Netherlands? Furthermore, why have Portugal and Slovenia passed marriage equality laws in spite of low public support on the issue? These questions will be addressed in Part IV. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN CRAFTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE POLICY
A. The United States
The legitimacy of prohibiting same-sex marriage has been under review by the highest courts in the United States and in Europe. In two recent decisions this June, the US Supreme Court held that the Defense of Marriage Act's restrictive definition of marriage was unconstitutional and allowed the judicial striking down of California's Proposition 8 to stand. 83 In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights decided in 2012 that Austria could lawfully refuse to authorize same-sex marriage without violating the European Convention on Human Rights. 84 The US Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in 1996, defines marriage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman" in regards to all federal regulations and legislation, which includes, inter alia, receiving federal benefits to which spouses are entitled (such as Social Security) and federal tax credits, exemptions, and deductions. 85 In addition, DOMA provides that states that do not recognize same-sex marriage need not give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages attained in states where they are legal. 86 In United States v. Windsor, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's decision that DOMA's restrictive definition of marriage violates equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. 87 The Second Circuit held that homosexuals are a "quasi-suspect class," and therefore, laws that single them out are subject to intermediate scrutiny. DOMA did not survive such scrutiny. 88 The Supreme Court held that DOMA's definition of marriage violated both due process and equal protection, but the Court did not apply intermediate scrutiny to laws singling out homosexuals and attempted to limit its holding by continuing to allow states (but not the federal government) to adopt their own definitions of marriage. 89 94 After the district court's decision, the State of California decided that it would no longer defend Proposition 8 and would not seek an appeal. 95 However, supporters of Proposition 8, who had intervened in the original suit, appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit. 96 The Ninth Circuit held that the intervenors had standing to defend Proposition 8 and affirmed the district court's holding on the merits. 97 The Ninth Circuit then granted a stay of its holding until the Supreme Court had a chance to review the case; same-sex marriages could therefore not resume in California until the Supreme Court issued its holding. 98 The Supreme Court held that the intervenors did not have standing to defend the 90 Evans, in which a number of municipalities in Colorado passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, and education. 101 Colorado voters responded by passing Amendment 2, amending the state constitution to preclude any legislation from protecting people on the basis of sexual orientation. 102 The Supreme Court held in Romer that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, in its Proposition 8 holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that Romer forbids states from taking away a right that has already been granted to homosexuals, whether the right is granted through city ordinance or court decision. 103 Given his dissent on the standing issue in Hollingsworth, Justice Kennedy appeared ready to decide Hollingsworth on the merits, 104 so that if the Supreme Court were once again faced with the question in Hollingsworthwhether a state can take away a right that has already been granted to homosexuals-it seems likely that Justice Kennedy would vote to decide the case similarly to Romer. The days when ballot initiatives could reverse forward progress on same-sex marriage may be over.
B. Europe
In While the ECtHR appears to subject discrimination against homosexuals to what would be called in the United States "heightened scrutiny" ("like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification"), the effect of the "wide margin of appreciation" that it affords states in crafting "economic and social strategy" is to make the standard of review closer to the US "rational basis" test. 112 The several countries in which there is very strong opposition to same-sex marriage, such as Russia and Turkey. 114 And it would have applied to countries that have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage, such Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine. Some have speculated that the court may fear that some European countries may feel so strongly about same-sex marriage that they would have been willing to withdraw from the Council of Europe in order to avoid same-sex marriage being imposed upon them.
However, the court seems to be walking on a tight rope, balancing between the need to apply the European Convention on Human Rights' equal treatment provisions to homosexuals with the need to avoid the political third rail of full same-sex marriage legalization. Under the Convention, the court has been granting more and more rights to gay people, particularly in the last decade. For example, in the July 2002 case of Goodwin v. United Kingdom, the court found that the United Kingdom violated Articles 8 (right to private and family life) and 12 (right to marry) of the Convention on Human Rights because the UK did not allow a transgender individual to get married. 115 Ms. Goodwin was a postoperative male to female transgender individual who presented herself to society as a female, but for legal purposes continued to be recognized by the UK as male. 116 In other cases, the court upheld the equal treatment of gay people such as in cases of the attribution of child custody and the right to adopt children. 117 However, in Schalk and Kopf, it failed to recognize the right of same sex couples to get married. 118 We might say that the court has an "everything but marriage syndrome."
How long the European Court of Human Rights can keep this increasingly contradictory dynamic-that of granting more and more rights to gay people under the Convention's requirement of equal treatment, while stopping short of recognizing equal marriage rights-remains to be seen.
As 
Religion in General
We propose that religiosity may be a major driver of public opposition to recognizing same-sex relationships. In the twelve most religious US states (as measured by the Gallup poll) 120 -with between 46 and 58 percent of their populations categorized as "very religious"-support for same-sex marriage is extremely low (ranging from 23 to 35 percent ). 121 All twelve of the most religious states have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage. In Mississippi, the most religious state in the United States, the state's same-sex marriage ban passed with 86 percent of the vote. 122 Of the states where same-sex marriage bans passed with more than 75 percent of the vote-Mississippi (86 percent), Tennessee (81 percent), Alabama (81 percent), Louisiana (78 percent), South Carolina (78 percent), Texas (76 percent), Oklahoma (76 percent), Georgia (76 percent), and Arkansas (75 percent)-all are extremely religious (58 percent, 50 percent, 56 percent, 53 percent, 52 percent, 47 percent, 48 percent, 48 percent, and 52 percent of the population categorized as "very religious," respectively). 123 The South, in which same-sex marriage bans exist in every state, comprises the most religious region of the country. 124 120. These states and their populations, categorized by religiosity, are as follows: Mississippi (58 percent classified as "very religious"), Utah (56 percent), Alabama (56 percent ), Louisiana (53 percent), Arkansas (52 percent), South Carolina (52 percent), Tennessee (50 percent), North Carolina (50 percent), Georgia (48 percent In contrast, the least religious region in the country is New England. 125 Every state in New England has legalized same-sex marriage. Of the twelve states that have the highest support in polling data for same-sex marriageVermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire, California, Hawaii, Maine, Washington, New Jersey, and Colorado-their religiosity is low (ranging from 19 percent to 35 percent of their populations categorized as "very religious"). 126 According to an analysis performed by Frank Newport, the Editor-in-Chief of Gallup, these geographic differences in religiosity cannot be explained by demographic factors, such as age, education, or race, but rather reflect what Newport describes as "differences in regional cultural traditions." 127 Thus, there is a very clear link between religiosity and support for same-sex marriage. The correlation should be clear from Figures 1 and 2 , which plot support for same-sex marriage against religiosity for the fifty states, using two different Gallup polls for religiosity. "" Same-sex marriage support is higher in states that have a higher share of religiously unaffiliated citizens (see Figure 3) . Religiosity and same-sex marriage support in the continental US
In general, same-sex couples choose to live in the least religious states and avoid living in the most religious states (see Figure 4) . 131
FIGURE 4 132
This trend is not surprising given that the more religious states are less supportive of same-sex relationships.
In addition, Washington D.C. has the largest concentration of same-sex couples in the entire nation (with eighteen same-sex couples per thousand households, more than twice the concentration of the highest state-Vermont, which has eight same-sex couples per thousand households). 133 It is difficult to determine whether the District of Columbia's large concentration of same-sex couples is based on its low religiosity (only 30 percent of the population is "very religious"), 134 its early adoption of domestic partnerships in 1992, the desirability of living in the nation's capital, or mere random variance resulting from focusing on such a small geographic unit. Regardless, the District of Columbia remains a very favorable environment for same-sex couples, given its adoption of same-sex marriage. Religiosity thus has a demonstrated correlation with same-sex marriage support. In addition, there are many other factors that appear to affect same-sex marriage support because they co-correlate with religiosity, such as age, religious sect, race, party affiliation, and political ideology.
Age & Religiosity
There are also significant generational differences in support for same-sex marriage. In general, support for same-sex marriage is stronger among younger Americans, who as a group are less religious than older generations. Millennials are four times more likely than their grandparents' generation and two times more likely than their parents' generation to be "religiously unaffiliated" (self-describing their religion as "atheist," "agnostic," or "nothing in particular"). 139 Twenty-six percent of millennials, 20 percent of generation X, 13 percent of baby boomers, and 8 percent of the silent generation self-describe as either atheist, agnostic, or unaffiliated with any particular religion. 140 Church attendance is also down among younger generations. Eighteen percent of millennials, 27 percent of generation X, 32 percent of baby boomers, and 44 percent of the silent generation attend church regularly. 141 We suspect that because millennials are less religious, they have less rigid viewpoints on homosexuality. Seventy percent of the silent generation, 56 percent of baby boomers, 47 percent of generation X, and 43 percent of millennials say same-sex relationships are "always wrong." 142 Correspondingly, millennials are 2.25 times more likely than their grandparents and 1.84 times more likely than their parents to support same-sex marriage. 143 Thus, religiosity may explain a large part of the reason why millennials are much more supportive of same-sex marriage than older generations.
Religious Affiliation
Religious affiliation clearly correlates to support for same-sex marriage. In 2013, 74 percent of the religiously unaffiliated, 55 percent of white mainline Protestants, 54 percent of Catholics, and 23 percent of white evangelical Protestants supported same-sex marriage. 144 In general, evangelical Protestants are much less supportive of homosexual rights than are mainline Protestants or Catholics. 145 These denominational differences can explain much of the regional variation in same-sex marriage support in the United States. 146 The South, which is most opposed to same-sex marriage, has the heaviest concentration of evangelicals "by a wide margin." 147 The Northeast has the largest concentration of Catholics, and it tends to be more supportive of same-sex marriage, perhaps because Catholics are one of the more supportive religious denominations (along with mainline Protestants). 148 Lastly, the West, which tends to be quite supportive of same-sex marriage, has the highest concentration of atheists and agnostics. 149 As the most religious group, evangelical support for same-sex marriage is the lowest among Protestant denominations, perhaps save Mormonism (which may engender even lower support for same-sex marriage). Thus, as depicted below in Figure 5 , the fewer evangelicals in a state, the higher the support for same-sex marriage.
FIGURE 5 150
Utah, however, is an outlier because of its large share of Mormons (58 percent of the state population). 151 Mormons appear to have comparably low levels of support for same-sex marriage.
Race
In addition, while Blacks are generally less supportive of same-sex marriage than whites (38 percent of Blacks as compared to 50 percent of whites support same-sex marriage), 152 Darren Sherkat et al. found that these racial differences in same-sex marriage support can be wholly explained by Support for same-sex marriage
Religious affiliation and same-sex marriage support in the continental US differences in denominational ties and religious participation. 153 The support gap cannot be explained by differences in political values, educational attainment, income, or gender. 154 These racial differences initially appeared to have been erased by President Obama's announcement of his support for same-sex marriage. There was an immediate 18 percentage point jump in Black support for same-sex marriage following the President's announcement. 155 While at first this jump in support seemed to have eliminated the Black-white gap in support for same-sex marriage, 156 recent Pew data shows that the gap still persists, and this jump in support was likely only temporary. 157 In the recent Proposition 8 vote in California, much blame was leveled at the Black community because exit polls showed that 70 percent of Black voters voted in favor of Proposition 8. 158 However, Professor Russell Robinson pointed out that not only were exit polls wrong and only 58 percent of Blacks voted for Proposition 8, but also the differences in voting behavior between whites and Blacks could be wholly explained by differences in religiosity, not race. 159 Professor Robinson, citing a study by Patrick Egan et al., stated that "once the authors controlled for religion, there were no significant racial differences. Thus, the biggest difference between the white vote and the Black vote is not race, but religion." 160 Not only did the Egan study find that religiosity fully explained the Black-white differential in Proposition 8 voting, 161 but it also found that among all voters, those that attended religious services "weekly or more often" were 22 percentage points more likely to support Proposition 8 than voters who attended only monthly. 162 Thus, the degree of religiosity not only affected Black voting patterns, but also had a large overall effect on Proposition 8 voting behavior.
To sum up, there has been a rapid shift in public opinion since 2003, which can partly be explained by decreased stigma and partly by a greater proportion of the US population that personally knows someone who is gay, but this shift can also be partially explained by changes in religious attitudes.
Party Affiliation
Party affiliation has a strong correlation with same-sex marriage support. In 2013, 59 percent of Democrats and 57 percent of Independents, but only 29 percent of Republicans support same-sex marriage. 163 Support has also grown more among Democrats and Independents. Since 2004, Republican support for same-sex marriage has grown by twelve percentage points (from 17 to 29 percent), whereas support among Democrats has grown 19 percentage points (from 40 to 59 percent) and support among Independents has grown 20 percentage points (from 37 to 57 percent). 164
Political Ideology
Self-identified ideology also has a strong correlation with same-sex marriage support. In 2013, 73 percent of liberals and 30 percent of conservatives supported same-sex marriage. 165 The correlation between ideology and same-sex marriage support is demonstrated in Figure 6 . "Conservative advantage," as measured by Gallup, is the percent of self-identified conservatives in the state minus the percent of liberals. While political ideology seems to be a relatively strong predictor of samesex marriage support, the correlation for party identification and same-sex marriage support is not quite as strong, as illustrated in Figure 7 .
FIGURE 7 167
Because of the South's long history-now rapidly disappearing-of support for the Democratic Party, religiosity appears to be a better proxy for conservatism than does party affiliation. For example, Mississippi, the most religious state, whose marriage ban passed with the highest proportion of the vote of any state, is only the 12th most Republican state, but is the 4th most conservative. 168 Thus, religiosity has an important role to play in predicting public support for same-sex marriage in the United States.
However, the above polls only capture self-reported religiosity, ideology, party affiliation, and same-sex marriage support among a state's citizens. Since not all citizens vote, a state's red or blue status, based on past voting behavior, may be a better predictor of actual state policies towards same-sex marriage. Of the dark red states (states where the Republican won the last four presidential elections), all twenty-two have bans on same-sex marriage, twenty by state constitution and two by statute. 169 Thus, to the extent that low religiosity does not match state policies towards same-sex couples, it may be due to lower voter turnout among more liberal citizens. One study, for example, found that in 74 percent of elections, non-voters were disproportionately Democratic. 172 The religiosity of the population captured in polls may thus not translate into actual votes. Therefore, while religiosity may be a good predictor of general support for same-sex marriage, it may not be quite as good at predicting elections outcomes (such as for ballot initiatives). 
B. Europe
The correlation between religiosity and support for same-sex marriage in Europe is not quite as remarkable as that in the United States, but a correlation does exist.
In the European Union, there is a general trend between increased religiosity (as measured by the 2010 Eurobarometer) and decreased support for same-sex marriage, as illustrated in Figure 8 . Religiosity and support for same-sex marriage in the EU However, the trend is stronger for the most religious countries than the least religious. In Figure 8 , the scatter diagram becomes more tightly arranged as religiosity increases. Thus, the correlation is not as strong for less religious countries. Likewise, in Figure 9 , there are a number of countries that do not appear to fit the trend line. Moreover, the contrast is striking when this figure is compared with Figures 1 and 2 , depicting the trend in the United States.
FIGURE 9 174
There are five clear outliers in the EU that don't fit the trend line-Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania (countries that are not very religious but have low support for same-sex marriage). Given that most of Eastern Europe remains adamantly opposed to gay rights, we suspect that some other factor, associated with their shared history under communism, correlates with low support for same-sex marriage. There may be some co-correlate with both conservatism and religiosity that we have yet to identify, or it may be that Eastern Europeans are more likely to be atheists than similarly politically conservative Western Europeans because of the legacy impact of the communist suppression of organized religion.
Estonia and Latvia appear to be the largest outliers because of their unique ethnic composition. During Soviet rule, in order to promote the Sovietization of all aspects of life, the Soviets implemented a mass migration program into the 179 One might hypothesize that the link between religiosity and same-sex marriage opposition has been de-coupled in former Soviet states because if someone is forced to give up her religion, this is not evidence that the conservatism associated with religion has been eliminated, whereas if someone leaves her religion voluntarily, this is evidence of such. The Soviet Union did often engage in forced atheism campaigns in its satellites, often to the point of nationalizing and confiscating all church properties and outlawing religious practices. 180 If people retained their conservatism but gave up their religion, this would explain why religiosity does not seem to correlate with same-sex marriage support in many Eastern European countries.
This hypothesis, however, does not explain why Estonia remains one of the least religious nations in the EU, but also one of the most strongly opposed to same-sex relationships. Estonia has never had a strong religious tradition, even before the Soviet occupation. 181 Many Estonians viewed religion as an undesirable tradition performed by the Swedish and German ruling classes. 182 However, if the hypothesis is modified it may still be valid: if a person leaves her religion, this is evidence of a transformation away from conservatism, but if a person was never religious or was forced to give up her religion, a lack of religiosity is not evidence of a lack of conservatism, at least as far as gay rights (and potentially other social issues) are concerned.
However, further research is still needed. The above hypothesis does not explain why the Czech Republic, with comparable religiosity to Estonia, displays more than double the support for same-sex marriage and has registered partnerships, while Estonia does not. Both countries consistently rank as the two least religious states in the EU, and both countries appear to be proud of their non-religiosity. 183 Yet both have such different attitudes towards same-sex marriage (52 percent support in the Czech Republic, compared to 21 percent for Estonia). 184 These differential levels of same-sex marriage support, but comparable levels of religiosity, would make for an interesting further study.
A regression analysis by Jurgen Gerhards provides one explanation for why religiosity is more explanatory of social attitudes towards homosexuality in Western Europe than Eastern Europe. Gerhards found that in the EU, the more modernized a country becomes, the more supportive its populace becomes of homosexuality (as measured by the question "can homosexuality ever be justified?"). 185 Education level, as one measure of development, had an independent effect on social attitudes towards homosexuality. 186 The lower support for same-sex relationships in Eastern Europe may be due to lower levels of economic, social, and political development.
In addition, Gerhards found that religious affiliation affected attitudes towards homosexuality. 187 Among the denominations, "Orthodox Christians, Catholics and especially Muslims are much more ready to say that homosexuality is not justifiable than are Protestants." 188 In addition, Gerhards found that "religious integration" (as measured by church attendance) also correlated with a person's views on homosexuality. The more frequently a person attended a religious institution, the less likely that person was to view homosexuality as being permissible. 189 Lastly, Gerhards found that the effect of religious integration on social attitudes towards homosexuality was greater than the effect of religious denomination. 190 This result means that as far as social attitudes towards homosexuality are concerned, it matters more how fervently someone adheres to her religion than to which religion she belongs. Slovenia is an interesting case. When it passed its domestic partnership law in 2005, granting only limited property rights to same-sex couples, it had a center-right government in power. 200 The Social Democrats and Liberals refused to take part in the vote for the law because it granted no social benefits to samesex couples (such as Social Security), provided no health insurance benefits, did not allow same-sex couples to be next-of-kin, and contained an explicit statement that marriage was not permitted. 201 In 2010, a left-leaning government proposed an amendment to the family code that would have legalized same-sex marriage, but Conservatives later removed this from the bill. 202 The final bill, which would have merely equalized the rights of domestic partners and government could pass same-sex marriage with little backlash, in spite of Portugal being a deeply religious country.
Thus, in Europe, religiosity is not as strong a predictor of state policy as in the United States because Europeans are less likely to resort to popular votes to determine whether to legalize same-sex marriage and because religiosity in Europe does not correlate as strongly to voting behavior. Thus, European legislatures, more than their American counterparts, are free to ignore public attitudes and either legalize same-sex marriage, in spite of low public support (such as in Portugal), or refuse to legalize in spite of strong public support (such as in Germany).
However, religiosity remains an important factor, particularly in Western Europe, and over time, Western Europe should be expected to influence Eastern Europe, at least for those countries in Eastern Europe that are members of the EU. Some people even argue that there is currently a movement in the EU towards total religious neutrality. 215 For example, last year, when Slovakia attempted to print Christian symbols on Euro coins, it was blocked from doing so by the European Commission, before the latter finally gave in. 216 The charge against Slovakia's attempt to print religious Euro coins was led by France, which "enforces a rigid division of church and state at home." 217 As Western Europe continues to influence the Eastern European members of the EU towards secularization, and as the societies of these latter countries develop and modernize, one would expect religiosity to become less influential in those countries' politics, opening room for change on issues involving the rights of same-sex couples.
CONCLUSION
We have found three main trends in the United States and Europe regarding the relationship between religiosity and support for same-sex marriage. First, in the United States, there is a remarkably close correlation between religiosity and the legal status of same-sex marriage. The states that have legalized same-sex marriage or openly recognize same-sex relationships tend to be the least religious, while the states that have constitutional bans on same-sex marriage tend to be the most religious. Second, in Western Europe, there is a close correlation between religiosity and the legal status of same-sex marriage. Where the correlation does not hold, at least in some cases (such as Spain and Germany), it is a product of which party is in control of the government. Centerright parties tend to slow reform in non-religious countries, whereas center-left parties tend to expedite reform in more religious countries. Third, Eastern 
